Fault-Tolerant Hotelling Games by Avin, Chen et al.
Fault-Tolerant Hotelling Games
Chen Avin∗ Avi Cohen† Zvi Lotker∗ David Peleg†
January 16, 2018
Abstract
The n-player Hotelling game calls for each player to choose a point on the
line segment, so as to maximize the size of his Voronoi cell. This paper studies
fault-tolerant versions of the Hotelling game. Two fault models are studied: line
faults and player faults. The first model assumes that the environment is prone
to failure: with some probability, a disconnection occurs at a random point on the
line, splitting it into two separate segments and modifying each player’s Voronoi
cell accordingly. A complete characterization of the Nash equilibria of this variant
is provided for every n. Additionally, a one to one correspondence is shown between
equilibria of this variant and of the Hotelling game with no faults. The second
fault model assumes the players are prone to failure: each player is removed from
the game with i.i.d. probability, changing the payoffs of the remaining players
accordingly. It is shown that for n ≥ 3 this variant of the game has no Nash
equilibria.
1 Introduction
Background. The Hotelling game, originated in Hotelling’s seminal work in 1929 [8],
modeled the competition of two servers on a linear market (e.g., two ice-cream vendors
on a beach strip) as follows. Two servers choose a location on the line segment [0, 1], and
the payoff of each server is equal to the length of the segment of points closer to it than
the the other server (a.k.a. its Voronoi cell). Hotelling showed that if both servers locate
themselves at the center of the line, then a Nash equilibrium would be reached, i.e., a
situation in which neither server would rather relocate unilaterally. He next showed that
three servers competing on the line reach no equilibrium state - in every configuration
of servers there will be one server who can increase its profit by moving.
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Figure 1: Ice cream vendors on a beach strip.
This initial idea sparked decades of research. Notably, in 1975, Eaton and Lipsey
[4] completely characterized all Nash equilibria of the n server game, for every n. Over
the years numerous variations were made to each component of the game, including the
number of players, the pricing policy, the behavior of clients, and the geometry of the
market. Eiselt, Laporte and Thisse [6] provide an annotated bibliography categorized
by these features (for a more recent survey see Eiselt et al. [5]).
Motivation. In this paper, we consider the Hotelling game in a failure prone setting,
and explore how the Hotelling game behaves differently in a world where faults may occur
either in the environment, or in the servers themselves. In day to day life, uncertainly
must be accounted for. For instance, one of the players may fail to open their store due
to illness or vacation, or the road might be blocked due to infrastructure work or safety
issues, denying clients access to their preferred vendor. While it is uncertain whether
such an event occurs on a given day or not, it is certain to happen one day. It therefore
stands to reason that failures would be accounted for in player strategies and payoffs.
Indeed, fault-tolerant problems constitute a fertile area of research in Computer Science.
Yet, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to consider fault-tolerance aspects
of the Hotelling game.
Contributions. We analyzed two types of failure models. In the first variant, we
consider a failure prone environment, wherein it is possible that the line would be blocked
at a random point, denying the passage of clients through it. We refer to this variant of
the game with n players as the Line Failure Hotelling game and denote it by Hlf(n).
We characterize all existing equilibria of Hlf(n) (Theorem 3.4). Moreover, we show that
each Nash equilibrium of Hlf(n) corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the non-failure
Hotelling game H(n) (Theorem 3.2).
The second variant we consider assumes a reliable environment, but failure prone
players. Each player (independently) has some probability of being removed from the
game. This version of the game (with n players) is referred to as the Player Failure
Hotelling game, denoted Hpf(n). We show that if there are at least three players, then
the game admits no Nash equilibrium (Theorem 4.1).
2
Related Work. Fault tolerant facility location problems have been studied extensively
from an optimization perspective in the operations research and computer science com-
munities [1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12]. However, relatively little work has been done from a game
theoretic approach. Two recent papers do consider fault tolerant location games. Wang
and Ouyang studied a failure prone competitive location game in a two dimensional
environment [13]. However, they studied a variant in which two players position several
facilities each, and did not extend the model to a greater number of players. Zhang et
al. considered a discrete competitive location model in which there are finitely many
clients and finitely many potential facility locations [14]. Their model, while similar to
our model in theme, bears little resemblance to Hotelling’s original game.
In 1987, De Palma et al. [3] introduced randomness into the Hotelling game, though
in a manner different than we do. Rather than uncertainty in the reliability of the en-
vironment or the players, their paper studied uncertainty in client behaviors. That is,
clients normally shop at the closest vendor, but with some probability, due to unquan-
tifiable factors of personal taste, they skip a seller and travel further to the next one.
This paper has a similar approach to our paper, but considers a different problem than
ours.
Aside for location games, other types of fault tolerant games have recently been
studied. For example, Gradwohl and Reingold [7] studied the immunity and tolerance
of games with many players. Immunity means that faults have a small affect on the
utility of non-faulty players. Tolerance means that optimal strategies remain optimal
when faults are introduced to the game (even though the utilities may be different from
the case without faults). The authors show that the games themselves are resilient to
faults and quantify the strength of their resilience. We, on the other hand, consider a
game that is very sensitive to faults and ask how would the players adapt their strategies
in a given fault model.
Organization. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Hotelling
game formally along with known results. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the Hotelling game
with line disconnections and server crashes, respectively. Section 5 concludes the paper
and offers future directions of research.
2 Model and Preliminaries
The Game. The Hotelling game on the line segment [a, b], denoted as H(n, [a, b]),
involves n servers, si for i = 1, . . . , n, who place themselves at different points xi on
the segment. Each point on the line also represents a client, who will be served by the
nearest server. The market of each server is the line segment containing the clients that
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Figure 2: A possible configuration of the game. Servers s1 and sn are the peripheral
servers, s1 and s2 are paired, and the half-markets of s3 are marked in the figure.
will be served by it (this segment is also known as the server’s Voronoi cell). The payoff
of each server si, denoted p(si), is the length of his market. Servers strive to maximize
their payoff.
We assume clients are uniformly distributed over the line. We also assume that no
more than one server can occupy a given location; the minimal distance between two
servers is some arbitrarily small ε > 0.1 When two servers are separated by a distance
of ε they are said to be paired. We say two servers si and sj are paired at location x if
xi = x− ε/2 and xj = x+ ε/2; with a slight abuse of notation, we hereafter denote this
as xi = xj = x. Conversely, a server is isolated if it is not paired to another server.
Each server si divides its market into two sides, referred to as half-markets. We
denote by L(si) and R(si) the lengths of si’s left and right half-markets respectively.
Therefore, the payoff of si is
p(si) = L(si) + R(si).
Two servers are said to be neighbors if no server is located between them. A server that
has neighbors on both sides is called an interior server. A server that has one neighbor
is called a peripheral server. That is, the two peripheral servers are the server closest to
0 and the server closest to 1. (See Fig. 2.)
By definition, the market of an interior server extends half the distance to its two
neighbors. The length of an interior server’s market is thus half the distance between
its neighbors, wherever the server is located between those neighbors. The line segment
between the boundary and the corresponding peripheral server is called a hinterland.
1Setting a minimal distance between servers is common practice in the Hotelling game literature.
This prevents servers from infinitely moving closer and closer to each other to slightly improve their
payoff. However, the servers choose their location simultaneously and thus two servers might inadver-
tently choose the same location. We assume that in this case players make small corrections until they
meet the constraint. Alternatively, we could say that two servers can be located at the same point and
split the payoff in half. However, this leads to unnatural equilibria and thus makes the analysis more
complicated. For example, in the two-server game, locating both servers at the same point, anywhere
on the line, yields an equilibrium.
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The market of a peripheral server includes its hinterland in one direction, and extends
half way to its neighbor in the other direction.
The game is in a Nash equilibrium if no server can increase its payoff by moving to
a location other than its present location.
As an example, consider the basic Hotelling game which is played on the line [0, 1],
and involves four servers, si for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, who need to place themselves at different
points on the line, xi for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Consider a solution in which servers s1 and s2
place themselves at the point 1/4, with s1 to the left of s2, and servers s3 and s4 place
themselves at the point 3/4, with s3 to the left of s4. (See Figure 3.) It is easy to verify
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Figure 3: Equilibrium with 4 servers.
that this solution of the game, whose payoff is 1/4 per server, is a Nash equilibrium (i.e.,
none of the servers is motivated to change its location).
Known Results. Eaton and Lipsey (1975) [4] proved that the following are necessary
and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium:
(EL1) Each peripheral server is paired.
(EL2) No server’s whole market is smaller than any other server’s half-market.
The proof these conditions are sufficient is a bit involved, but it is easy to see why
they are necessary. If (EL1) does not hold, a peripheral server would increase its profit
by locating closer to its neighbor. (EL2) follows from the fact that any server can obtain
a market equal to any other server’s half-market by pairing with it.
By applying these equilibrium conditions, Eaton and Lipsey determined the equilibria
of the game depending on the number of servers. We present their results in what follows.
One Server. The payoff of a single server s1 is p(s1) = 1, wherever it is located.
Two Servers. As shown by Hotelling, there is a unique equilibrium, where the two
servers are paired at x1 = x2 = 1/2, with payoffs p(s1) = p(s2) = 1/2.
Three Servers. No equilibrium exists. It follows from the fact that (EL1) and (EL2)
contradict one another in this case.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium with 6 servers.
Four Servers. There is a unique equilibrium, with equal payoffs of 1/4, where two servers
are paired at x1 = x2 = 1/4, and the other two at x3 = x4 = 3/4.
Five Servers. There is a unique equilibrium, where two servers are paired at x1 = x2 =
1/6, two others are paired at x4 = x5 = 5/6, and an isolated server is located at x3 = 1/2.
Note that here, the payoffs are not uniform: s3 has payoff p(s3) = 1/3, while all other
servers have payoff 1/6.
More than five Servers. There exist infinitely many equilibria, characterized as follows:
peripheral servers are paired with their neighbors and have identical hinterlands. Each
peripheral pair is separated from the closest server by a distance twice as long as the
hinterland. The interior servers are paired or isolated.
As an example, consider the game H(6, [0, 1]). Let the length of the hinterland be x,
and without loss of generality let the servers be ordered such that x1 < x2 < . . . < x6.
From the above characterization of equilibria, it follows that in every equilibrium s1 and
s2 are paired at x1 = x2 = x, s3 is located at x3 = 3x, s4 is located at x4 = 1− 3x and
s5 and s6 are paired at x5 = x6 = 1 − x. The distance between s3 and s4 is at least ε
and at most 2x (by condition (EL2)).
That is, the above described configuration is an equilibrium for every x such that
ε ≤ (1− 3x)− 3x ≤ 2x ,
or rather 1/8 ≤ x < 1/6. (See Figure 4.)
3 Hotelling Game on the Line with Link Failures
Let us now consider the game with environmental failures. For concreteness, let us
assume that the only possible failure is a disconnection of the line at point f , chosen
uniformly from [0, 1], which severs the line into two separate markets, and forces some of
the clients (specifically, those disconnected from their originally chosen server) to change
their server selection. For simplicity, assume at most one disconnection may occur, with
constant probability 0 < r < 1, at a location f ∈ [0, 1] chosen uniformly at random.
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We call this game the Line Failure Hotelling game and denote it as Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]).
The new payoff function is denoted as plf and becomes the expected profit under these
assumptions (i.e., the payoff of player si is 1 − r times its payoff in the fault-free case
plus r times its expected payoff in case a disconnection occurred at point 0 < f < 1).
Let us begin by considering this game with only one server. Unlike the basic Hotelling
game, in which the location of a single server is inconsequential, in this setting the
optimal location of a single server is at the center of the line, x1 = 1/2, as we show next.
Let x1 ∈ [0, 1] be the location of the server s1. If no failure occurs, the payoff is 1. If the
line is disconnected at 0 < f < x1, then the payoff is 1 − f . If the line is disconnected
at x1 < f < 1, then the payoff is f . It follows that the payoff of s1 is
plf(s1) = E[p(s1)] = (1− r) · 1 + r ·
[∫ x1
0
(1− f)df +
∫ 1
x1
fdf
]
= 1− r
2
+ rx1 − rx21 .
That is, plf(s1) is a function of x1 that attains its maximum at x1 = 1/2. Hence the
only equilibrium is when the server is at the center of the market.
We next consider the two server variant. Without loss of generality let x1 < x2, i.e.,
s1 is located to the left of s2. Observe that the payoff of s1 is plf(s1) = Llf(s1)+Rlf(s1),
where Llf(s1) is the length of its hinterland, and Rlf(s1) is the length of its half-market
on the right. (See Fig. 5.)
• Calculating Llf(s1): if the line is disconnected at location 0 < f < x1, then the
length of s1’s hinterland is L(s1) = x1 − f . Otherwise, L(s1) = x1. The expected
length is therefore
Llf(s1) = E[L(s1)] = (1− r) · x1 + r ·
[∫ x1
0
(x1 − f)df +
∫ 1
x1
x1df
]
= x1 − r · x
2
1
2
.
• Calculating Rlf(s1): if no failure occurs, or if the line is disconnected at location
0 < f < x1 or x2 < f < 1, then the length of the half-market is R(s1) = (x2−x1)/2.
If, on the other hand, an edge is disconnected at x1 < f < x2, then R(s1) = f−x1.
Therefore,
Rlf(s1) = E[R(s1)] = (1− r) · x2 − x1
2
+ r ·
∫ x2
x1
(f − x1)df
x2 − x1 =
x2 − x1
2
.
It follows that the payoff of s1 is
plf(s1) = Llf(s1) + Rlf(s1) = x1 − r · x
2
1
2
+
x2 − x1
2
=
x2 + x1
2
− r · x
2
1
2
.
This function attains its maximum at x1 = 1/(2r). That is, as long as s1 remains on
the left of s2, s1 would move to 1/(2r). If 1/2 ≤ x2 < 1/(2r), then s1’s best response
would be pairing with s2.
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Figure 5: Calculating the expected payoff in the two-player game with link failures.
Note that 1/(2r) > 1/2 for every 0 < r < 1 and thus if x1 = 1/(2r) and x2 > 1/(2r),
then s2 would prefer to move to the left of s1. It follows that x2 < 1/(2r). By symmetry,
it also holds that x1 > 1 − 1/(2r). Hence, condition (EL1) holds, and as in the basic
Hotelling game, the only equilibrium is when both servers are paired at the center of
the line, i.e., x1 = x2 = 1/2. (See Fig. 6.)
0 11
2r
s1 s2
Figure 6: s1 is located such that its payoff is maximal, and moving closer to s2 would
reduce s1’s payoff. However, s2 would maximize its payoff by moving to the left of s1.
As a result of the above calculations, for the general game, with n ≥ 3 servers, we
have the following.
Observation 3.1 In the Hotelling game Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]), on the line with edge discon-
nections, the following holds:
1. A peripheral server located at distance x from the boundary has a hinterland with
an expected length of
x− r · x
2
2
.
2. Two neighboring servers at distance x gain a half-market of expected length x/2
each in the direction of the other (as in the basic Hotelling game).
3. Each peripheral server would increase his hinterland up to 1/(2r). That is, condi-
tion (EL1) holds unless the neighbor of a peripheral server is at a distance of more
than 1/(2r) from the boundary.
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In light of the observation above, if the game is played with three servers, then no
equilibrium exists. To see why, observe that if the interior server s2 is located between
1− 1/(2r) and 1/(2r), then the peripheral servers s1 and s3 would pair with s2 on both
sides leaving it with 0 payoff, and thus s2 would move. If, on the other hand, s2 is located
at x2 > 1/(2r), then s1 would locate at 1/(2r) and s3 would pair with s2. But then s3
could improve its payoff and would thus move. Due to symmetry, a similar argument
holds if we suppose s2 is located at x2 < 1− 1/(2r).
Next, consider the four server game Hlf(4, r, [0, 1]). Let us consider the strategy
profile where the location 0 < x < 1 satisfies that when s1 and s2 are paired at x and s3
and s4 are paired at 1− x all four servers receive the same expected payoff (any server
can pair with any other server and get his payoff). Since s1 and s2 are symmetric to s4
and s3 respectively it suffices to compare the expected payoffs of s1 and s2.
The following table compares the payoffs p(s1) and p(s2) according to possible values
of f , as well as with the failure-free case.
f P[f ] s1 s2
no failure 1− r x 1/2− x
[0, x] rx x/2 1/2− x
[x, 1− x] r(1− 2x) x 1/2− x
[1− x, 1] rx x 1/2− x
We now solve E[p(s1)] = E[p(s2)] for x, namely,
(1− r) · x + rx · x
2
+ rx · x + r(1− 2x) · x = 1
2
− x .
This yields
rx2 − 4x + 1 = 0,
and recalling that 0 < x < 1 we obtain
x =
2−√4− r
r
.
By the definition of x, this means that for every r, when x1 = x2 = (2−
√
4− r)/r
and x3 = x4 = 1− (2−
√
4− r)/r (See Fig. 7), each server si receives the same expected
payoff: E[p(si)] = 1/2−x. We claim that this is a Nash equilibrium, since no server may
increase his payoff by moving to another location. This follows from Observation 3.1.
As a motivating exercise, in Appendix A we explicitly show that no improving move
exists.
Moreover, this Nash equilibrium is unique due to the following considerations. First,
by Observation 3.1, the peripheral servers must be paired with their neighbors. Second,
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Figure 7: Equilibrium with 4 servers (x = 2−
√
4−r
r
).
the peripheral servers must have hinterlands of the same length, otherwise one would
take the hinterland of the other. Third, every two paired servers must have the same
expected payoff, otherwise one would take the half-market of the other. It follows that
the configuration above is the only Nash equilibrium.
Applying the considerations above to the game with five servers we find that the
only equilibrium is when s1 and s2 are paired at x1 = x2 = x, s3 is isolated at x3 = 1/2,
and s4 and s5 are paired at x4 = x5 = 1−x, such that the distance between s3 and each
peripheral pair is exactly twice x− r · x2/2. (See Fig. 8.)
Hence x satisfies 1/2−x = 2 ·(x−rx2/2), which yields rx2−3x+1 = 0, and recalling
that 0 < x < 1, we obtain Hence x satisfies
1
2
− x = 2 ·
(
x− r · x
2
2
)
,
which yields
rx2 − 3x + 1 = 0 ,
and recalling that 0 < x < 1, we obtain
x =
3−√9− 4r
2r
.
0 11
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Figure 8: Equilibrium with 5 servers (x = 3−
√
9−4r
2r
).
We next consider the general n-server game Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]). By Obs. 3.1, for any
given configuration of servers, adding link failures to the game only affects the expected
payoff gained from the hinterlands. Namely, a hinterland of length x shrinks by rx2/2
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in expectation, while every other half-market retains its length in expectation. This
leads to the following theorem. (Hereafter, proofs are deferred to the full paper.) Let
a = rx21/2 and b = 1− rx2n/2, hence
[a, b] =
[
r · x21
2
, 1− r · (1− xn)
2
2
]
.
Theorem 3.2 Let 0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xn ≤ 1. The configuration (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is a
Nash equilibrium of the game Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of
the game H(n, [a, b]).
0 1x1 x2 x3 xn
0 1x1 x2 x3 xnrx2
1
2
1− r(1−xn)22
Figure 9: Illustration of Theorem 3.2. The top line refers to the configuration in
the game Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]) and the bottom line refers to the configuration in the game
H(n,
[
r·x21
2
, 1− r·(1−xn)2
2
]
) .
Proof. Suppose that the servers s1, s2, . . . , sn are located at x1, x2, . . . , xn respectively.
Note first that both peripheral servers s1 and sn must be paired with their respective
neighbors. In the forward direction of the claim this holds by Observation 3.1; in the
inverse direction this follows from condition (EL1).
We start by showing that the payoff of each server given the configuration (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
is the same in both games Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]) and H(n, [a, b]), i.e., for each si, plf(si) =
p(si). Consider an interior server si, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. In the game Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]), its
payoff is
plf(si) =
xi+1 − xi−1
2
,
by Observation 3.1. In the game H(n, [a, b]), its payoff is also
p(si) =
xi+1 − xi−1
2
.
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Consider the payoff of the peripheral server s1. The servers s1 and s2 are paired, and
thus, by Observation 3.1, the payoff of s1 in the game Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]) is
plf(s1) = x1 − r · x
2
1
2
.
In the game H(n, [a, b]), the left border of the line is at a =
r·x21
2
and thus the payoff of
s1 is also
p(s1) = x1 − r · x
2
1
2
.
Similarly, the server sn gets the same payoff in both games. This proves that, in the
given configuration (x1, x2, . . . , xn), each server gets the same payoff in both games
Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]) and H(n, [a, b]).
We next show that for each move available to the server si, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, in one of
the two games Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]) and H(n, [a, b]), there exists a corresponding move in the
other game for which si obtains a greater or equal payoff.
Consider first a move within the interval defined by si’s present neighbors. If si is
an interior server then in both games Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]) and H(n, [a, b]) such a move does
not affect si’s payoff, as we have previously shown. If si is a peripheral server, since it
must be paired with its neighbor, such a move reduces si’s payoff.
Second, consider a move to an interior interval between two new neighbors sj and
sj+1. In both games, the payoff is equal to half the length of the interval, and thus the
move yields the same payoff in both games.
Finally, consider a move to either one of the hinterlands. In both games, the best
a server si could do is pair with the peripheral server, in which case si gets the payoff
of this peripheral server. But, as we have shown above, the payoff of each peripheral
server is the same in both games Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]) and H(n, [a, b]), and thus si obtains
the same payoff by making this move in both game. This proves that for each move si
may make in one of the games Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]) and H(n, [a, b]), there exists a move in
the other game for which si gets greater or equal payoff.
Assume towards contradiction that (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is a Nash equilibrium in the game
Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]) and but not in the game H(n, [a, b]). It follows that there exists a server
si that can improve his payoff by moving in the game H(n, [a, b]). But, as we have
shown above, si has the same payoff before moving in both games, and by moving si can
increase its payoff at least as much in the game Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]) as in the game H(n, [a, b]).
Therefore, si would also move in the game Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]), contradicting the assumption.
The inverse direction is similar. This concludes the proof that (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is a Nash
equilibrium in the game Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium in the
game H(n, [a, b]). 
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Theorem 3.2, in conjunction with conditions (EL1) and (EL2) for an equilibrium
of the basic Hotelling game, yield the following conditions for an equilibrium of the
Hotelling game with line disconnections.
Corollary 3.3 The following conditions are sufficient and necessary for an equilibrium
of the Hotelling game on the line with line disconnections.
(1) The peripheral servers are paired, and are located at an identical distance from the
boundary, x.
(2) No interior server’s whole market is smaller than x− r · x2/2.
(3) No interior server’s half market is larger than x− r · x2/2.
Proof. Suppose (x1, x2, . . . , xn), for x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xn, is an equilibrium of Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]).
Without loss of generality, let the server si be located at xi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By Theo-
rem 3.2, it follows that (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is an equilibrium of H(n, [a, b]), where a = rx
2
1/2
and b = 1− rx2n/2 as above. Therefore, conditions (EL1) and (EL2) must hold for this
configuration in H(n, [a, b]).
By condition (EL1), the servers s1 and s2 are paired and the servers sn−1 and sn are
paired. By condition (EL2), the hinterlands are equal in length, so
x1 − r · x
2
1
2
= (1− xn)− r · (1− xn)
2
2
,
which yields
x1 = (1− xn) .
This proves condition (1) holds.
By condition (EL2), no interior server’s whole market is smaller than any other
server’s half market, including the hinterland. This proves condition (2) holds.
By condition (EL2), no interior server’s half-market is larger than any other server’s
half market, including the hinterland. This proves condition (3) holds.
Conversely, suppose the configuration (x1, x2, . . . , xn) satisfies conditions (1),(2) and
(3), for x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xn, and without loss of generality, the server si is located at xi,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We show that (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is an equilibrium in the game H(n, [a, b]).
Given condition (1), condition (EL1) follows immediately in the game H(n, [a, b]).
Furthermore, it holds that
x1 = (1− xn) = x .
By condition (2), the whole market of each interior server si, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n is at least
x − r · x2/2, and by condition (3) the half market of each interior server sj is at most
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x − r · x2/2, for 2 ≤ j ≤ n. By transitivity, it follows that the whole market of si is at
least the size of the half-market of sj. This proves that condition (EL2) holds.
It follows that (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is an equilibrium of the game H(n, [a, b]), and thus,
by Theorem 3.2, (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is an equilibrium of the game Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]) as well.
This concludes the proof of the Corollary. 
To summarize, this section established the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4 In the n-server Hotelling game Hlf(n, r, [0, 1]) with a single line discon-
nection occurring with probability 0 < r < 1 at a location chosen uniformly at random:
(i) When there is a single server, a Nash equilibrium exists for which the server is
located at the center of the line, i.e., x = 1/2.
(ii) When two servers compete, there exists an equilibrium for which they are paired at
the center of the line, i.e., x1 = x2 = 1/2.
(iii) If there are three servers, then no equilibrium exists.
(iv) With four servers, there exists an equilibrium for which the servers are organized
in two pairs, at
x1 = x2 =
2−√4− r
r
, x3 = x4 = 1− 2−
√
4− r
r
.
(v) If n = 5, then there exists an equilibrium for which four of the servers are paired
at
x1 = x2 =
3−√9− 4r
2r
, x4 = x5 = 1− 3−
√
9− 4r
2r
,
and an isolated server is located at x3 = 1/2.
(vi) When more than five servers occupy the line, there exist infinitely many equilibria,
characterized as follows: peripheral servers are paired with their neighbor and have
identical hinterlands of length x. Each peripheral pair is separated from the closest
server by a distance twice as long as x− r · x2/2. The interior servers are paired
or isolated such that no server’s whole market is smaller than x− r · x2/2, and no
server’s half-market is larger than x− r · x2/2.
4 Hotelling Game on the Line with Server Crashes
Let us now consider a different failure setting, where the environment is resilient, but
the servers might crash. For concreteness, let us assume that each server might fail with
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probability 0 < r < 1 independently of the others. Once a server has failed, the clients
who chose this server originally must change their server selection. We call this game
the Player Failure Hotelling game and denote it as Hpf(n, r, [0, 1]). The new payoff
function is again the expected profit under these assumptions and is denoted as ppf.
If a single server si occupies the line, then it is clear that the server’s expected payoff
is ppf(s1) = 1− r wherever its location is. If there are two servers, then it is easy to see
that server crashes have no impact on the game. When one server fails, the other inherits
the entire line; when both fail, they both get nothing. Hence, the game is equivalent to
the basic Hotelling game and the only Nash equilibrium is when the servers are paired
at the center.
Let us now analyze the case where there are three servers on the line. In every
equilibrium, the peripheral servers are paired with the interior server on both sides, and
the interior server is located at 1/2. This is because when pairing with the interior
server, each peripheral server is closest to its neighbor regardless of which servers crash.
Moreover, if they are not located at the center, then one peripheral server could improve
its payoff by taking the hinterland of the other. Note that, in this state, the expected
payoff of the peripheral server s1 is
ppf(s1) = E[p(s1)] = (1− r)
(
1
2
+
1
2
· r2
)
,
since it always gets its hinterland (provided it did not fail), and it gets the remainder of
the line only if both other servers have failed. By a similar case analysis, the expected
payoff of the interior server s2 is
ppf(s2) = E[p(s2)] = (1− r)
(
0 +
1
2
· r(1− r) · 2 + 1 · r2
)
,
since (provided it did not fail) it gets nothing if both other servers do not fail, it gets
half the line if one of the other servers has failed, and it gets the entire line if both other
servers have failed. Note that s2 can move to take s1’s hinterland, hence this state would
be a Nash equilibrium only if
ppf(s1) = ppf(s2) ,
i.e.,
(1− r)
(
1
2
+
1
2
· r2
)
= (1− r)
(
0 +
1
2
· r(1− r) · 2 + 1 · r2
)
,
which yields
r2 − 2r + 1 = 0,
whose only solution is r = 1, i.e., all servers crash in every game, which is obviously
an equilibrium, but not an interesting one. This proves that no equilibrium exists when
there are three servers in the game.
15
We expand this logic to make a general claim about the game.
Theorem 4.1 For every n ≥ 3, the Player Failure Hotelling game Hpf(n, r, [0, 1]) has
no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. We have shown the claim holds for n = 3 so suppose n ≥ 4. Suppose there
exists a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for Hpf(n, r, [0, 1]), and let the three leftmost
servers be s1, s2 and s3, ordered from left to right (see Figure 10). Let s1’s hinterland
be of length x1, let s2 be paired with s1 (otherwise s1 would move closer to s2) and let
s3 be located at x3.
0 1x1 x3 xn
s1s2 s3 sn
Figure 10: The three leftmost servers in an n-server game.
Let us consider a move of s2 within the interval between its present neighbors s1
and s2. In all fault scenarios where s2 remains an interior server, such a move has no
effect. In case s2 either crashes or remains as the only non-faulty server, its location
does not matter. But in cases where s2 is a peripheral server, moving and increasing its
hinterland would increase its payoff. However, s2 is much more likely to become the left
peripheral server than the right peripheral server, since the former requires only s1 to
crash while the latter requires n− 2 servers to crash. For this reason, s2 would profit by
moving closer to s3. A detailed formal analysis follows.
Suppose s2 pairs with s3 and consider the following cases:
1. s2 becomes the left peripheral server and has a non-faulty neighbor si. In this case
pairing with s3 increases s2’s payoff from x1 + (xi−x1)/2 to x1 + (x3−x1) + (xi−
x3)/2. This occurs with probability r · (1− r)2.
2. s2 becomes the right peripheral server and s1 is non-faulty. In this case pairing
with s3 decreases s2’s payoff from 1− x1 to 1− x1− (x3− x1)/2. This occurs with
probability rn−2 · (1− r)2.
3. Otherwise, pairing with s3 does not change s2’s payoff, because s2 either crashed
or remained the only non-faulty server or remained an interior server.
In conclusion, when s2 pairs with s3, in case 1 his payoff is increased by (x3 − x1)/2
with probability r · (1 − r)2, and in case 2 his payoff is decreased by (x3 − x1)/2 with
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probability rn−2 · (1 − r)2. In cases 3, s2’s payoff is unchanged. In total, s2’s payoff
increases as a result of this relocation by
r · (1− r)2 · x3 − x1
2
− rn−2 · (1− r)2 · x3 − x1
2
= (r − rn−2) · (1− r)2 · x3 − x1
2
,
which is strictly positive for 0 < r < 1 and n ≥ 4 as long as x3 > x1.
Therefore, s2 must be paired with s3. However, the peripheral server s1 must be
paired with s2 as well. But then s2 would be paired on both sides and as we have seen
in the three server game this cannot be an equilibrium. Namely, s2 would pair with
s1 on the left or with s3 on the right. We thus reach a contradiction, proving that no
equilibrium exists if there are more than three servers in the game. 
5 Conclusion
In this paper we considered two fault tolerant variants of the Hotelling game: link failures
and player faults. On the one hand, we have shown that the game is resilient to link
failures in some sense - each equilibrium is related to an equilibrium of the no-faults
Hotelling game by rescaling the interval along with player positions. On the other hand,
we have shown that the game is vulnerable to player failures. No equilibrium exists
because players tend to converge towards the center. Table 1 compares the numbers of
Nash equilibria in each model
Table 1: The number of Nash equilibria that exist in each variant of the game depending
on the number of players.
n Server Crashes Line Disconnect No Faults
1 ∞ 1 ∞
2 1 1 1
3 0 0 0
4 0 1 1
5 0 1 1
≥ 6 0 ∞ ∞
There are many possible future directions for this research. A large number of vari-
ants of the Hotelling game have been studied and each would be interesting to consider
in a faulty setting, such as: the Hotelling game on graphs, on the plane or over Rn, the
Hotelling game with sequential entry, and so on. Another interesting direction would
be to try other fault models. Some examples are models where the number of faulty
players is bounded, where faulty players remain in the game but act unexpectedly (or
“Byzantinely”), or where faults are injected adversarially rather than at random.
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Appendix
A Nash Equilibrium of the 4-Server Game with Link
Failures
Consider the solution presented in Figure 7, and suppose that one of the servers, denoted
s∗, moves to location y between 0 and x. The identity of s∗ does not change his payoff
since one of the other players will be located at x.
The following table compares the payoff of s∗ to the payoff of s1 in the original state
(wlog, because all servers have the same expected payoff).
f P[f ] s1 s∗
— 1− r x (x + y)/2
[0, y] ry x− y/2 x/2
[y, x] r(x− y) (x− y)/2 (x + y)/2
[x, 1] r(1− x) x (x + y)/2
We claim that E[p(s1)] ≥ E[p(s∗)], and thus obtain the following inequality.
(1− r) · x + ry · (x− y
2
) + r(x− y) · x− y
2
+ r(1− x) · x ≥
(1− r) · x + y
2
+ ry · x
2
+ r(x− y) · x + y
2
+ r(1− x) · x + y
2
.
Shifting all terms to the left hand side and simplifying yields
(1− r) · (x− y
2
) + r · x− y
2
· (1− y − x) ≥ 0.
Recall that 0 < r < 1 and 0 ≤ y < x < 1/2, therefore all terms on the left hand side
are non-negative and the inequality holds. Hence, no server would gain from moving
between 0 and x.
It is left to show that no server would gain by moving between x and 1/2, since the
right half of the segment is symmetrical.
Suppose now server s∗ relocates at y between x and 1/2, we then obtain the following
table.
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f P[f ] s2 s∗
— 1− r 1/2− x 1/2− x
[0, x] rx 1/2− x 1/2− x
[x, y] r(y − x) (y − x)/2 1/2− x
[y, 1− x] r(1− x− y) (1 + y − 3x)/2 1/2− x
[1− x, 1] rx 1/2− x 1/2− x
We conclude that any server moving between x and 1/2 would have an expected pay-
off of 1/2−x, which does not improve his payoff (rather, his payoff remains unchanged).
In summary, when the servers s1, s2, s3 and s4 are located at x1 = x2 = (2−
√
4− r)/r
and x3 = x4 = 1 − (2 −
√
4− r)/r respectively (see Figure 7), the system is at a
Nash equilibrium. No server may improve his expected payoff by changing his location
(assuming the other servers stay in the same place).
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